Claremont Colleges

Scholarship @ Claremont
All HMC Faculty Publications and Research

HMC Faculty Scholarship

1-1-2006

An Optimal Brain Can Be Composed of
Conflicting Agents
Adi Livnat
Princeton University

Nicholas Pippenger
Harvey Mudd College

Recommended Citation
Livnat, Adi, and Nicholas Pippenger. “An optimal brain can be composed of conflicting agents.” Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences of the United States of America 103, no. 9 (February 28, 2006): 3198-3202.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the HMC Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion
in All HMC Faculty Publications and Research by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact
scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.

An optimal brain can be composed
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Many behaviors have been attributed to internal conflict within
the animal and human mind. However, internal conflict has not
been reconciled with evolutionary principles, in that it appears
maladaptive relative to a seamless decision-making process. We
study this problem through a mathematical analysis of decisionmaking structures. We find that, under natural physiological limitations, an optimal decision-making system can involve ‘‘selfish’’
agents that are in conflict with one another, even though the
system is designed for a single purpose. It follows that conflict can
emerge within a collective even when natural selection acts on the
level of the collective only.
bounded rationality 兩 collective decision making 兩 computational
complexity 兩 levels of selection 兩 modularity

I

nternal conflict is manifested in a broad array of animal
behaviors. For example, when a rat is offered both food and
an electric shock at the end of an alley, it oscillates at a certain
distance from them, given certain parameters of food and shock
(1). Researchers have attributed this oscillation to wavering
between approach and avoidance (1). Additionally, in separate
groups of rats, one group facing food only and one group facing
shock only, the tendencies to approach and to avoid were
measured by the force exerted on a harness (2). Results suggested that, in the combined setup, these tendencies opposed
each other effectively at the point of wavering (2). Hence
researchers believe that conflicting tendencies can co-occur at a
dynamic equilibrium (1, 2).
Simultaneous, contradictory tendencies also appear in the
form of ambivalence (3). For example, when a female stickleback
transgresses into a male’s territory, the male often exhibits both
incipient attack and courtship movements simultaneously (3). In
a more pathological case, herring gulls attempt to both peck and
incubate red-painted eggs introduced into their nests (3). The
redness seems to elicit attack, whereas the shape seems to elicit
brooding (3). These behaviors indicate independent and potentially conflicting behavior programs. Ambivalence, as well as
oscillation, has been observed in various species of birds, fish,
and mammals (3, 4).
Further evidence for internal conflict comes from displacement activities. When evenly matched male herring gulls are
involved in a dispute at the boundary of their territories, they
often pull the grass aggressively (3). It is thought that they are
caught between a fight and a flight response and that, somehow,
the collision between these incompatible drives triggers a nestbuilding-related activity (3). Other animals in similar situations
exhibit a host of displacement activities including preening, beak
wiping, drinking, eating, and self-grooming (3, 5, 6).
In humans, internal conflict is rife and perplexing. Consider
the disulfiram pill: Its sole purpose is to make a person sick if
s兾he drinks alcohol, yet some alcoholics knowingly choose to
take it. It appears that the pill serves as a threat on the self, and
thus reflects full-blown internal conflict. A more subtle conflict
emerges in the delay of gratification (7). When children are
offered to either wait for a preferred candy or accept an inferior
one immediately, they sometimes cover their eyes or look away
from the immediate one (7). Furthermore, they can be taught to
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suppress impatience by manipulation of thought (7, 8). Brainimaging studies have shown that such behaviors result from
competition between neural systems (9). Indeed, conflict has
been a main tenet in psychology (10–15), and massive evidence
on it has been accumulated (7–16).
The evidence as a whole establishes the importance of internal
conflict as an organizing concept and demonstrates its applicability across the animal kingdom. However, the existence of
conflict seems at odds with the Darwinian view. We often take
the individual to be an approximate unit of selection and,
accordingly, expect the different parts of an individual, whether
physical or mental, to work together as a team for a common
goal. It is therefore surprising that those different parts would
not only pursue different goals but actually come to contradict
and frustrate each other. This mode of operation appears
maladaptive in comparison with a more seamless decisionmaking system that could have possibly evolved. We are therefore left with an important class of observations that has not
been reconciled with evolution.
In trying to address this problem, Trivers (17) and Haig (18)
relied on the idea that the gene rather than the individual is the
unit of selection (19). Accordingly, different genes within the
same individual may have different goals, and their goals may be
in conflict (17, 18) [such as in transposons (19) and imprinting
(20)]. But whereas genetic conflict is important, it does not apply
easily to the macroscopic behavioral evidence mentioned above.
For example, it would necessitate ‘‘genes for approaching food’’
and ‘‘genes for avoiding shock’’ that benefit differentially from
these two activities.
Here we show that internal conflict can emerge even in the
absence of gene-level selection. Namely, conflict can emerge
within a collective even when natural selection acts on the level
of the collective only. We contend that this phenomenon is a
natural consequence of physiological limitations, and that internal conflict can emerge even in an optimal collective subject to
those limitations.
Three conceptual pieces will be used to derive this result. They
are as follows: (i) the idea that behavior results from computation and is subject to computational limitations, (ii) the idea that
conflict can be defined rigorously in terms of utility functions,
and (iii) the idea that utility functions can be assigned to parts
of a computational system based on information-theoretic considerations. These issues will be discussed in turn below. Later
in this article we will give a verbal summary of the model and
result, and we will end with a discussion of biological implications. Detailed analysis can be found in the Supporting Appendix,
which is published as supporting information on the PNAS web
site.
A Computational View of Behavior
We take the point of view that behavior results from computation (21). Behavior is dictated by a mechanism that matches the
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If behavior results from computation, it is subject to computational constraints. The brain is limited in the number and density of
neurons and synapses, the speed of signal transduction, the space
reserved for wiring, etc. (23). Thus, like any other resource, the
computational resource is limited (24, 25). The theory of bounded
rationality has speculated that such a limitation may lead to conflict
(26). More concretely, we hypothesize that the fittest computationally limited system [i.e., the boundedly optimal system (27)] can
manifest internal conflict and test this hypothesis within a rigorous,
mathematical framework.
A Game-Theoretic Definition of Conflict
Notably, conflict has never been defined for the purpose above
and, as a central element in this work, we provide a gametheoretic definition of it. Informally, we say that agent i is in
conflict with agent j if there exists a parsimonious utility function
that describes the behavior of i, and if, according to that utility
function, i could have achieved a higher utility if j behaved
differently than it ( j) did in some play of the game.
This definition covers the range of phenomena referred to as
conflict in the scientific literature. For example, as applied to the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game [PD (28)], it states that conflict exists
unless both players cooperate, in accordance with intuition. It
also includes ‘‘mutual conflict’’ as a case where i benefits from
a change in j and vice versa, as in the Nash equilibrium of the PD.
However, here we focus on agents that are analogous to parts
of an organism’s mind or, more generally, parts of a biological
collective. Applying the term ‘‘utility’’ to such agents departs
from its usual application to individual organisms (49), and we
use it to denote the existence of a goal that an agent pursues and
that defines the agent’s behavior. Thus, the attribution of
internal conflict to Miller & Brown’s rat implies the existence of
two agents: one whose goal is to satisfy hunger and another
whose goal is to avoid danger. According to the definition, one
could have achieved its goal if the other behaved differently.
Likewise in the case of the disulfiram pill, one agent purposely
takes the pill, whereas another seeks drink, and each could
achieve its goal only at the expense of the other.
Formally, let agents i 僆 {1, . . . , N} be parts of a computational
system. Let S be the state of the world, let Ôi be i’s output (or
‘‘action’’), and let  i(S,Ôi) be the consequence to i from its action
given some implicit assumption about the behavior of the rest of
the world. Say that there exists a function Ui maximized by Ôi as
follows:

Utility Under Occam’s Razor
When selfish goals are assigned to agents a priori, the possibility
of conflict can be taken for granted, as it has been taken in the
foundation of game theory. However, here we start with a system
that serves one goal and ask whether conflicting agents emerge
in it a posteriori. To answer this question in accord with the
definition of conflict, we must know these agents’ utilities, which
are not available in advance and have to be inferred. This
requirement raises yet another question: How can we infer an
agent’s utility from its behavior alone (without even knowing in
advance that it has any preferences, as required by the principle
of revealed preference in economics)?
Our method is based on information theory. It requires that
the behavior of an agent be described in the most parsimonious
way. If the utility function Ui provides the most parsimonious
description for the behavior of agent i, then Ui is thus qualified.
To measure parsimony, we use its precise measure common in
computer science, namely the number of information bits in the
description (31; and see Supporting Appendix). A fundamental
result in complexity theory shows that this measure retains its
meaning regardless of the descriptive formalism (31).
Parsimony has predictive power, and it is very generally
desirable (31). It is also known in philosophy as Occam’s razor,
by which ‘‘entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity (ref.
31, p. 317).’’ In regard to the descriptions of agents, it will allow
us to establish the following: Unbeknownst to an agent, its
actions may promote the goal of the collective, given the actions
of the other agents and the computational limitations. Yet it
does not necessarily follow that the agent’s goal aligns with that
of the collective or of any other agent by extension. One must
first assign agent utilities in accord with the requirement of
parsimony, and then see whether or not they satisfy the definition of conflict.
Note that the principle of revealed preference in economics
assumes a priori the existence of preference and of a set of
alternatives that can be compared pairwise. Here we move
beyond these assumptions by inferring goals and hence utilities
from information-theoretic considerations alone. This approach
can be useful in general, by setting a criterion for the interpretation of behavior. (Although we will satisfy this criterion here
in a mathematically precise way, it can be useful also on an
intuitive level.)

Then i acts as if to maximize utility, given by the function Ui.
Now let i(S,Ôi, . . . , ÔN) be the actual consequence to agent
i from the combined action of all agents (i need not be identical
to  i). Following the notation of ref. 29, let Ô⫺i ⫽ {Ô1, . . . , Ôi⫺1,
Ôi⫹1, . . . , ÔN} (e.g., if Ô ⫽ {Ô1, . . . , ÔN} then Ô ⫽ {Ô⫺i, Ôi}).
We say that i is in conflict with j if and only if:

Demonstrating Meaningful Internal Conflict
To qualify internal conflict, we required that the description
of an agent based on a conflicting utility function be its most
parsimonious description. However, for that conflict to be
meaningful (‘‘true conflict’’), another requirement is necessary.
Namely, the task of the collective clearly must not be to simulate
conflict between its parts. To exclude such simulated conflict,
the most parsimonious description of the task must not involve
conflict a priori. With this requirement, the definition of the
problem is complete.
ˆ be the system that maximizes fitness, P (
ˆ ), among
Hence, let 
all systems ⬘ whose complexity, L(⬘) satisfies a certain computational limitation, l:

Ui共i共S, Ô⫺j, Ôj兲兲 ⬍ U i共  i共S,Ô⫺j,Õj)) ?Õj .

P共
ˆ 兲 ⱖ P共⬘兲 ᭙⬘ 僆 兵:L共兲 ⱕ l其.

Ôi ⫽ arg maxOiU i共  i共S,O i兲兲, ᭙S.

[2]

[3]

Recall that the Nash equilibrium is defined as a situation
where each agent does not benefit from a change in its own
action, all else being equal (30). Here we defined that conflict
exists unless each agent does not benefit from a change in any
Livnat and Pippenger
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(The functions P and L must be reasonable, as in our model; see
Supporting Appendix.) Through a rigorous mathematical analysis
of decision-making structures, we now show that true conflict
can emerge in 
ˆ.
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f: E 3 R.

other agent’s action, all else being equal. Thus, our definition of
conflict is a certain inverse of the Nash equilibrium concept. (To
obtain the exact definition of the Nash equilibrium from Eq. 3,
replace j with i, ⬍ with ⱖ, and ? with @.)

EVOLUTION

state of the organism and its environment with an appropriate
response (22) (e.g., the presence of a predator is matched with
a flight response; the presence of food and hunger is matched
with approach). Therefore, one can model behavior as a mathematical function that maps states, E, to behavioral responses, R:

Summary of the Model
Our model (described in detail in the Supporting Appendix)
examines the generic problem of finding shortest paths, widely
studied in computer science. It can be illustrated with
the following analogy, but later we will discuss its biological
application.
Imagine a robot that walks on a set of islands connected by
bridges. An experimenter places the robot on one island, places
a flag on another island, and observes the robot’s behavior. After
the experimenter repeats this procedure many times with different pairs of islands, it appears that the robot always takes the
shortest path to the flag.
Saying that the robot takes the shortest path to the flag is a
parsimonious way of describing its behavior. We can now make
predictions based on it. If the robot and兾or the flag are placed
on islands where they have not been placed before, we may guess
the behavior of the robot even though we have not observed it
yet in that circumstance.
According to this description of the robot’s behavior, the robot
has a ‘‘goal’’: to reach the flag as quickly as possible. There is a
measurable quantity that is reduced consistently and efficiently
by its behavior (distance to the flag), hence ‘‘cost’’ (distance
from the flag) is minimized, and ‘‘utility’’ (proximity to the flag)
is maximized. This utility-based description of its behavior is a
parsimonious and useful description. (It also matches the concept of utility in economics by defining a complete and transitive
preference ordering on the robot’s locations with respect to the
flag.)
Let each island have an index number. At each point in time,
the robot’s decision-making mechanism gets as input the index
number of the island that it is currently standing on as well as the
index of the island that the flag is on, and gives as output the
index of the island to step onto next. Other mechanisms carry out
this next step accordingly. Now, imagine that the situation
remains exactly as in the above, except that the experimenter is
not aware of the physical existence of the islands and the bridges.
The experimenter can only control the inputs (which are just
numbers) and record the outputs (also numbers) of the robot’s
decision-making mechanism. Despite his兾her blindness to the
physical landscape, if the experimenter is resourceful, s兾he
would be able to deduce a model equivalent to that landscape,
i.e., a graph (a mathematical construct consisting of nodes
connected by directed edges, where nodes and edges correspond
to islands and bridges respectively), that would describe the
behavior of the robot and make predictions about its future
behavior just as before. The utility-based description of the robot
will also be valid as before.
We now use the above setup for two purposes. First, we let the
task of finding shortest paths between any pair of origin and
target nodes on a certain graph be our robot’s computational
task. Second, we show that the best decision-making system
consists of agents whose behaviors can be described most
parsimoniously by assuming that the agents solve shortest-path
problems on their own respective graphs, according to the
inference of the blind experimenter described above. It follows
that each agent has its own parsimonious utility function. The
measurement of parsimony is explained in detail in the Supporting Appendix, and we mention here only that it becomes independent of descriptive formalism (asymptotically in the size of
the graph, which is the reason we use large graphs in the formal
proof).
The computational architecture we consider for the construction of the robot’s decision-making mechanism is that of circuits,
widely studied in theoretical computer science (e.g., 32, 33). A
circuit is an acyclic interconnection of input terminals, elementary computational units called ‘‘gates,’’ and output terminals, by
means of wires (Fig. 1a). The input terminals receive signals
3200 兩 www.pnas.org兾cgi兾doi兾10.1073兾pnas.0510932103

Fig. 1. Gates and circuits. (a) As an example of simple gates, consider the
AND and NOT gates, which receive Boolean inputs. AND produces on its
output wire兾s ‘‘1’’ if both its inputs are ‘‘1,’’ and ‘‘0’’ otherwise; NOT produces
‘‘1’’ if its single input is ‘‘0,’’ and ‘‘0’’ if that input is ‘‘1.’’ By wiring together
three AND gates and four NOT gates as shown, a very simple circuit can be built
to compute the exclusive OR (XOR) function, which produces ‘‘1’’ (at the
output O1) if its two inputs, I1 and I2, are unequal and ‘‘0’’ otherwise. If AND
and NOT gates (or gates from any other ‘‘complete basis,’’ as defined in the
Supporting Appendix) are given in sufficient numbers, circuits could be built
to compute any Boolean function of any numbers of inputs and outputs. This
complexity is achieved through the interconnection of many simple units, as
in the brain. (b) As an example of a larger gate, consider the threshold gate,
which produces ‘‘1’’ if the weighted sum of its inputs exceeds a certain
threshold value, T, and ‘‘0’’ otherwise. This particular gate is analogous to the
single neuron (c): In both of the cases of this gate and the neuron, when the
addition of stimuli from all dendrites or inputs surpasses a certain threshold
value, a current is transmitted along the axon tree or output wires. Thus,
circuits made of threshold gates simulate multilayered feed-forward neural
networks.

from the environment, and the gates receive signals from the
input terminals or from other gates. Each gate computes a
function of the signals on the wires directed into it and places the
result on each of the wires directed out of it (including, as a
special case, a linear threshold function). As a result, signals are
produced on the output terminals that represent the circuit’s
response to the environment.
Clearly, circuits are analogous to multilayered feed-forward
neural networks. Each gate is analogous to a neural soma, its
input wires to dendrites, and its output wires to the axon tree; the
circuit’s input and output terminals are analogous to sensory and
motor neurons respectively (Fig. 1 a–c). We assume that a single
gate is simple relative to the circuit as a whole, and that many
gates are needed for the circuit’s construction, in accordance
with real neurons and brains.
We further restrict the architecture of the circuit for mathematical tractability in either of two ways: first, by considering
circuits where only one wire comes out of each gate (a strong
restriction), and next, by limiting the extent of merging and
diverging of paths in the circuit (sequences of interconnected
gates) instead (a weak restriction); these limitations are described in detail in the Supporting Appendix. We conjecture that
a result similar to the one to be described holds also in an
unrestricted space of circuits, although this conjecture may not
be provable with presently known techniques.
Finally, we place a computational limitation on the number of
gates (weighted by their sizes; Supporting Appendix). Because of
this limitation, we must account for possible mistakes and illegal
moves. We define that, whenever the output of the decisionmaking circuit labels a node that can be reached in one step, the
robot will identify that node and step onto it. Otherwise, (if the
move is illegal) the robot will stay in place. We also define that
Livnat and Pippenger

Discussion
Now the graphs that are navigated by the agents are analogous
to the various demands of life, such as food, sex, and protection.
In nature, these demands can often, but not always, be addressed
separately; and both these effects are captured in the model.
When the demands do not interact, decision is easy; but when
they do interact, the best tradeoff between them is hard to
calculate. In such cases, if there had been no computational
limitation, the organism always would have pursued the best
tradeoff between the conflicting demands. This mode of operation would have given it the appearance of a unitary decisionmaker. But, importantly, it turns out that under a computational
limitation, the best decision-making system is one that is made
of multiple agents, each caring for one aspect of homeostasis and
for that aspect alone, without ‘‘sympathy’’ for the other agents
or for the global task.
This result illuminates the behaviors abovementioned. As
applied to Miller & Brown’s rat, it suggests a ‘‘hunger agent’’ and
a ‘‘fear agent’’ that act independently and reach a resolution not
by calculating the best tradeoff but by pitting one force against
another. In the model (Supporting Appendix), conflict leads to
indecision, as is observed in the rat (Fig. 2). With a change of
interpretation, the model is also reminiscent of the sticklebacks
and herring gulls, where the conflicted, illegal move corresponds
to simultaneous attack and courtship or pecking and incubating.
The more elaborate forms of conflict, where agents engage in
extensive strategic interaction, demand further study; however,
they too must satisfy the general definition of conflict. We have
now shown that this definition can be satisfied even within an
optimized entity under physiological constraints. That is, the
division of the mind into independent and sometimes conflicting
Livnat and Pippenger

agents can be advantageous. This result is consistent with
evidence of modularity in brain structure (34–36), although it
demonstrates not only the emergence of agents in general but
also the emergence of agents with personal goals that can be in
true conflict with one another.
In evolutionary terms, instead of arguing hypothetically that
internal conflict is a remnant of past evolution (i.e., that it results
from sliding off an adaptive peak in a changing fitness landscape), one can now make the stronger argument that even if
natural selection were allowed to run its course and produce the
fittest possible organism, there could still be conflict inside it.
The only requirement is a physical limitation on the computational resource, which appears to be ubiquitous in nature.
Importantly, this does not contradict the possibility that there
could be conflict also because of evolutionary as well as learning
constraints. Indeed, in some sense, there is a connection between
the various constraints, once we can look at the evolutionary
process itself as a ‘‘learning’’ process limited in time (37), and,
therefore, in the structural and behavioral complexity achieved.
It follows that, in many cases, the observation of conflict may
not indicate conflict between units of selection (such as organisms or genes) as is normally conceived but rather conflict within
a unit of selection. Gene regulatory networks, dynamic physiological systems, nervous systems, and even social insect colonies
can all be seen as collective decision-making systems and thus
provide many opportunities to test this point. Consider the social
insects: To a first approximation, their phenotypes are selected
on the level of the colony (38). Yet when honeybees build a
comb, they appear to ‘‘steal’’ each other’s materials (S. C. Pratt,
personal communications). In leaf cutter ants, certain workers
manage trash heaps where potentially pathogen-infected waste is
thrown. If these workers try to get back into the nest, the other
workers fight them back and thus prevent infection of the
colony’s fungus garden (39). These observations are more readily
explained by internal conflict than by genetic conflict. Consider
also dynamic physiological systems: Most hormones are secreted
in antagonistic pairs (40); thus insulin and glucagon determine
the set point of blood sugar level by promoting opposing
PNAS 兩 February 28, 2006 兩 vol. 103 兩 no. 9 兩 3201
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Fig. 2. Internal conflict in Miller & Brown’s rat. A ‘‘hunger agent’’ attempts
to approach food when food is identified and idles otherwise, and a ‘‘fear
agent’’ attempts to avoid danger when danger is identified and idles otherwise. The agents usually move freely within each pair of states. However,
when food and danger are in the same location, the simultaneous initiation
of approach and avoidance is ‘‘illegal.’’ The definition of conflict is satisfied in
that if any one agent idled, the other agent could have obtained its goal.
Elements in this example resemble ones in the formal proof of conflict
(Supporting Appendix). Whereas here only four states are shown, the formal
proof allows for many behavioral states, a technical requirement for proving
description parsimony.

EVOLUTION

the best circuit is the one that takes the largest number of correct
steps (i.e., steps that are consistent with a shortest path from
origin to target).
It is now possible to prove the following theorem. For some
graphs, the best possible circuit for finding shortest paths among
all architecturally restricted circuits with up to a certain number
of gates (weighted by size) is made of a number of subcircuits
(agents), each of which seeks shortest paths on its own graph and
maximizes its own parsimonious utility function and, these
agents are in conflict with one another. Conflict emerges when
the circuit produces a certain illegal move. This move has the
property that each agent would have benefited if any other agent
had behaved differently, thereby legalizing the move in a manner
favorable to the focal agent. Thus, one agent’s maximization of
its utility prevents the maximization of utility by others, and, by
definition, all agents are in mutual conflict (Supporting Appendix
and Figs. 3–5, which are published as supporting information on
the PNAS web site).
Finally, we replace the robot with an organism and let nodes
in the graph represent states of the organism and its environment
[states in E (Eq. 1)]. For example, some nodes may represent the
state of being idle and having a food item at hand. The
decision-making mechanism (the CNS) is aware of the current
state and, based on it, chooses an action that will lead the
organism to another state (e.g., commence approach). This
state-based approach accords with McNamara and Houston’s
(22) model of fitness maximization, although here the organism
uses a deterministic rather than stochastic strategy. At any
period, the organism pursues a target state that is appropriate for
it under current conditions and life history strategy. Thus, the
organism’s task is to choose the most efficient sequence of steps
from any origin to any target state that the environment and life
history prescribe. Similarly to ref. 22, the organism must follow
this optimal path to avoid fitness costs. In this fitness-maximizing
pursuit, the same circuitry mentioned in the previous paragraph
is used and leads to conflict.

are in conflict with each other and can be seen as somewhat
selfish, even though the system is designed for a single purpose
and does not represent different parties in advance. Thus a
certain interaction can appear to be both a team game on one
level and, at the same time, a game between selfish agents on
another level. In evolutionary terms, conflict can emerge not
only when selection operates on the level of the single agent but
also when it operates purely on the level of the collective.
Importantly, this phenomenon reverses the classic question of
the evolution of cooperation (28). Instead of showing how
cooperation can emerge among agents with selfish goals, we
showed how conflict can emerge within a collective that has one
goal. Although we have provided a proof of principle to this
effect, the various mechanisms by which such conflict could
emerge call for further study and exploration.

catabolic and anabolic reactions simultaneously, a contradiction
which entails an energetic cost and may reflect rudimentary
conflict. Further along this line, Zahavi (41) has made the radical
claim that some chemical signals within a multicellular organism
such as NO and CO are purposely noxious, i.e., that the harm
they cause is a part of the message sent. Although this is
perplexing, effects of this sort may, in theory, be possible.
As regards the organismal scale, internal conflict demands
special attention, because it has been a focus across the behavioral and social sciences. For example, numerous forms of
self-control have been discussed in economics (e.g., refs. 42 and
43), psychology (e.g., refs. 8, 13, and 44), and philosophy (e.g.,
ref. 45), and have been attributed to divided interests within a
single individual (e.g., ref. 43). Thus Minsky (46) viewed the
mind as a society of conflicting agents, a view which has
culminated in the application of game theory to the interactions
between the agents of the mind (43, 47, 48). So far, however,
proponents of this view have taken the existence of agents with
different and sometimes contradictory goals as an assumption,
much like it is taken to be in classical (nonteam) game theory.
This assumption has left out the question of why such agents
should exist in the first place within a single unit of selection,
given the apparent contradiction with evolutionary principles.
We have helped to close that gap by showing that the best
computational system under a limitation can involve agents that
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